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State v. Weber, 121 Nev. Adv. Op. 57 (Sept. 15, 2005)1
CRIMINAL LAW – DEATH PENALTY
Summary
An appeal from a judgment of conviction and sentence of death, pursuant to a jury
trial.
Disposition/Outcome
Judgment of conviction and sentence of death affirmed.
Facts and Procedural History
On April 4, 2002, Appellant T.J. Weber raped his girlfriend’s 14-year-old
daughter, whom he had been molesting for five years, and killed his girlfriend, Kim, and
her 17-year-old son. Weber then fled Las Vegas and traveled to several other states
before returning to Las Vegas on or before April 12. On the morning of April 14, the day
on which funeral services for the victims were to take place, Weber attacked Kim’s 15year-old son and the son’s care giver with a baseball bat. Again, he fled. Weber
remained at large for two weeks. Finally, on April 28, 2002, police located and arrested
Weber.
In May 2002, a grand jury indicted Weber, charging him with seventeen felony
counts. The charges included two counts of open murder with the use of a deadly
weapon, two counts of attempted murder with the use of a deadly weapon, two counts of
first-degree kidnapping, two counts of burglary, and various counts arising from Weber’s
prolonged sexual abuse of his girlfriend’s adolescent daughter. After indictment, the
State filed notice of its intent to seek the death penalty. In February 2003, Weber
received a jury trial and the jury found him guilty on all seventeen felony counts. In the
sentencing phase of Weber’s trial, the jury found the existence of thirteen aggravating
factors. It subsequently recommended a sentence of death for the murder of Kim’s son
and a sentence of life without the possibility of parole for the murder of Kim.
Discussion
On appeal, Weber advanced a number of arguments: First, Weber argued that the
district court erred in denying his motion to sever the charges against him; second, Weber
argued that the district court erred in admitting hearsay evidence; third, Weber argued
that the district court erred in denying his challenge of two jurors for cause, thereby
denying him his right to a fair trial; fourth, Weber argued that the district court erred in
instructing the jury on flight; fifth, Weber argued that the district court improperly denied
his motion to suppress evidence seized during a search performed under authority of a
search warrant that Weber maintains was improper; sixth, Weber argued that the penalty
hearing of his trial should have been bifurcated; seventh, Weber argued that he should
have made the final argument during his penalty hearing; and eighth, Weber argued that
the State’s notice of intent to seek the death penalty was flawed. The Court denied all of
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Weber’s claims. Additionally, the Court reviewed Weber’s death sentence and
considered the three questions required under NRS § 177.055(2).2
I.

Denial of Weber’s Motion to Sever Charges

NRS § 173.115 provides that a defendant may be charged with multiple offenses
in the same indictment if the offenses charged are “1. Based on the same act or
transaction; or 2. Based on two or more acts or transactions connected together or
constituting parts of a common plan or scheme.” Weber asserted that the joinder of all
seventeen charges was improper under the statute and that his crimes should have been
separated into three separate indictments. Weber argued that the charges for his sexual
crimes, spanning five years, against the fourteen-year-old could be joined together, the
murders of April 4, 2002, could be joined together, and the beatings of April 14, 2002,
could be joined together. Weber maintained, however, that these three groups of crimes
should have been kept separate and distinct. The Court agreed that the three groups of
crimes did not constitute a common plan or scheme and that joinder was inappropriate on
that ground.3
Nevertheless, the Court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
joining the claims because the claims were “connected together” pursuant to NRS §
173.115(2). Having never interpreted the phrase “connected together” under this statute,
the Court articulated that “for two crimes to be ‘connected together’ under NRS
173.115(2), a court must determine that evidence of either crime would be admissible in a
separate trial regarding the other crime.”4 The court determined that evidence of Weber’s
crimes would have been admissible in trials for Weber’s other crimes because the
evidence would have been relevant and because Weber failed to show that the admission
of such evidence would have been unfairly prejudicial. Accordingly, the court found that
all of Weber’s seventeen counts were “connected together.”
II.

Admission of Hearsay Evidence

Weber argued that the district court erred in admitting testimony of Kim’s friend
regarding statements Kim had made to that friend on the day Weber murdered her.
Kim’s friend testified that Kim had told her about a fight she had had with Weber the day
before. Kim’s friend testified to the following:
She had told me that a boy had called for [her daughter]; that [Weber] had
answered it and went crazy, cussed out the kid on the phone; proceeded to call
[the daughter] names and call her a slut and racial gestures to her going out with
black guys.
2
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And [the daughter] told Kim. Kim was mad. She told [Weber]: [my daughter] is
going to be able to talk to boys and go out with boys. You are not her boyfriend;
you’re my boyfriend. You need to start acting like a father figure, if you’re in her
life, and not her boyfriend . . . .
And she was going to drive her and her boyfriend wherever they wanted to go on
a date . . . .5
The district court admitted the evidence, finding that it was not offered for the
truth of the matter asserted. On appeal, the Court ruled that the testimony included
several layers of hearsay, most of which were offered for the truth of the matter asserted.
Nevertheless, the Court held that, although most of the testimony was inadmissible
hearsay, the court’s admission of the testimony was not prejudicial. The Court found that
admission of the evidence was not prejudicial both because most of the evidence was
admissible through other means and because the overwhelming evidence of Weber’s guilt
rendered the hearsay testimony unnecessary for a guilty verdict.
III.

Denial of Weber’s Challenge of Jurors

During voir dire, Weber challenged two potential jurors whom he believed were
incapable of serving as impartial jurors. The district court denied Weber’s challenges.
On appeal, the Court found that the district court erred in denying Weber’s challenges,
but found the error to be harmless. The Court ruled that the district court’s error was not
prejudicial because Weber eventually relieved both of the challenged jurors via
peremptory challenge. Although Weber exhausted all of his peremptory challenges
during voir dire, he failed to allege that any of the jurors actually seated were not fair or
impartial.
IV.

Flight Instruction

At trial, Weber unsuccessfully objected to a jury instruction on flight. On appeal,
Weber argued that a flight instruction was improper because his arrest was delayed
because of incompetent police work, not his flight. The Court found Weber’s contention
without merit. A flight instruction is appropriate so long as it is supported by the
evidence.6 The Court ruled that the evidence in Weber’s case supported a flight
instruction. Specifically, Weber abandoned his car on the day of the murders and
traveled, by bus, to several states before returning to Las Vegas. Furthermore, he
purchased a fake mustache, and hid in his former home, despite police seal.
V.

Denial of Weber’s Motion to Suppress

Weber argued that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress
evidence of child pornography found on Weber’s computer depicting sex acts between
Weber and Kim’s daughter. Weber contended that the search warrants authorizing the
computer searches were unconstitutional because they were based on “unsupported and
5
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misleading probable cause statements.”7 The Court found Weber’s argument without
merit.
The Court found that the warrants had issued on probable cause supported by the
affidavit of a Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department detective. The affidavit stated
that Kim’s friend had told him that Weber was very computer literate, could make fake
I.D.’s, used numerous fraudulent credit cards, and had run scams over the internet. The
Court found this information, along with the detective’s knowledge and experience,
sufficient probable cause to search Weber’s computer.
VI.

Bifurcation of Penalty Phase

Weber argued that his penalty hearing should have been bifurcated. The Court
summarily rejected the argument, citing McConnell v. State.8
VII.

Last Word at Penalty Hearing

Weber argued that the district court erred in denying his motion to argue last to
the jury in his penalty hearing. The Court summarily rejected this argument, citing NRS
175.141(5).
VIII.

State’s Notice of Intent to Seek Death Penalty

Weber argued that the district court erred in denying his motion to strike the
State’s notice of intent to seek the death penalty. Weber argued that the death penalty
scheme is unconstitutional. The Court refused to revisit its prior holding that the scheme
is constitutional.9
IX.

Required Considerations under NRS § 177.055(2)

NRS § 177.055(2) requires the Supreme Court to review every death sentence and
consider, in addition to any errors enumerated on appeal, the following three issues:
(c) Whether the evidence supports the finding of an aggravating circumstance or
circumstances;
(d) Whether the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion,
prejudice or any arbitrary factor; and
(e) Whether the sentence of death is excessive, considering both the crime and the
defendant.10
A. Whether the Evidence Supported the Aggravating Circumstances
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The jury found that thirteen aggravating circumstances existed during the penalty
phase of Weber’s trial. Aggravators one through eight were based on NRS § 200.033(2),
which provides that “first degree murder is aggravated when it was committed by a
person who has been convicted of a felony ‘involving the use of threat or
violence.’”11The Court concluded, without discussion, that Weber used or threatened
violence during the commission of the following felonies: the sexual assault of Kim’s
daughter between January 1, 1997 and December 1, 1998; the first-degree kidnapping of
Kim’s daughter on April 4, 2002; the sexual assault on Kim’s daughter on April 4, 2002;
the first-degree kidnapping of Kim’s seventeen-year-old son on April 4, 2002; the
attempted murder of Kim’s fifteen-year-old son on April 14, 2002; and the attempted
murder of the fifteen-year-old son’s caregiver on April 14, 2002.
The Court examined, and subsequently found sufficient evidence to support the
finding of the use or threat of violence, in the two counts arising from Weber’s sexual
assault of Kim’s daughter between January 1, 2000, and April 3, 2002.
Aggravators nine through eleven were based on NRS § 200.033(4), which
provides that first-degree murder is aggravated when committed while the perpetrator
was engaged in “burglary, invasion of the home or kidnapping in the first degree, and the
person charged . . . [k]illed or attempted to kill the person murdered.”12 Weber argued
that this aggravator is invalid because it makes every felony-murderer eligible for the
death penalty. However, Weber was not convicted of felony murder; he was convicted of
deliberate, premeditated murder and/or murder by torture. Therefore, the Court found
sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that these aggravating circumstances
existed.
Aggravator twelve was based on NRS § 200.033(8), which provides that firstdegree murder is aggravated when it involves torture of the person killed.13 The Court
previously held that torture “requires that the murderer must have intended to inflict pain
beyond the killing itself.”14 Here, Weber murdered Kim’s son by binding his hands and
feet with duct tape, placing weights on him so that he could not move, duct-taped his eyes
and mouth, but left his nostrils free, and placed a plastic bag over his head. Autopsy
results revealed that the boy died a slow, suffocating death, both bleeding and vomiting
out of his nose. The Court found this sufficient to support a jury’s finding that Weber
tortured his victim.
Aggravator thirteen was based on NRS § 200.033(12), which provides that firstdegree murder is aggravated when “the defendant has, in the immediate proceeding, been
convicted of more than one offense of murder . . . .”15 Weber was convicted of the
murders of both Kim and her son.
Accordingly, the Court found that there was sufficient evidence to support the
aggravating circumstances, as found by the jury.
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B. Whether the Sentence of Death Was Imposed Under the Influence of Passion,
Prejudice or Any Arbitrary Factor
The Court concluded that there was no evidence that Weber’s sentence was
influenced by passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor. To the contrary, the Court
found evidence that Weber’s jury was discerning and that Weber’s crimes, themselves,
caused the jury to recommend a sentence of death.
C. Whether the Sentence of Death is Excessive, Considering Both the Crime and
the Defendant
The Court concluded that Weber’s crimes were particularly brutal and senseless.
The Court found that, “[g]iven the appalling nature and circumstances of [Kim’s son’s]
murder and Weber’s character as revealed by all his crimes, death is not an excessive
sentence for Weber.”16
Conclusion
Weber’s conviction and sentence were affirmed. The Court found that the district
court did not err in denying Weber’s motion to sever charges. The district court did,
however, err in admitting hearsay evidence and denying Weber’s challenges to two
potential jurors. The Court found, however, that these errors were not prejudicial. The
district court did not err in instructing the jury on flight, nor did it err in denying Weber’s
motion to suppress the evidence obtained from his computer. Furthermore, the court
found without merit Weber’s arguments that the penalty phase of his trial should have
been bifurcated, that he was entitled to make the last argument at his penalty hearing, and
that the State’s death penalty scheme is unconstitutional. Finally, the Court reviewed
Weber’s sentence, pursuant to NRS § 177.055(2), and found that the evidence supported
the finding of aggravating circumstances, the sentence was not imposed under the
influence of passion, prejudice, or an arbitrary factor, and the sentence was not excessive.
Concurring Opinion
Justice Hardesty filed a concurring opinion, with which Justice Rose agreed.
Although concurring in outcome, Justice Hardesty disagreed with the majority on two
points. First, Justice Hardesty disagreed with the Court’s conclusion that it was proper to
join the counts arising from the April 14 beatings of the fifteen-year-old boy and his
caregiver with the rest of the counts. Nevertheless, Justice Hardesty agreed that the error
was harmless.
Second, Justice Hardesty would interpret the term “connected together,” under
NRS § 173.115, more narrowly than did the majority. Justice Hardesty cautioned that
cross-admissibility may be too lenient a standard. He urged district courts to be
“reluctant to join unrelated criminal acts for trial unless it is shown that the evidence of
both crimes is clearly cross-admissible, that the two criminal incidents appear to be
closely connected together, and that no substantial prejudice will occur to the
defendant.”17
16
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